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11. Introduction.
The relationship between market power and innovative activity has been a much-
debated issue ever since Schumpeter’s pioneering work. On the one hand, large firms
in concentrated markets are often seen as the main engines of technological progress,
for reasons that relate to the optimal scale for R&D and innovation, appropriability
conditions, and the presence of financial constraints. On the other, it is often argued
that the lack of competition may lead to inertia and managerial slack, and hence to a
reduced level of innovative activity. The view of competition as a stimulus to
innovation is probably the majority position among policy-makers today. However,
the theoretical and empirical support for this view is far from clear. In fact, despite a
large literature on the subject, the issue of the links between market power and
innovation is still not settled.
In particular, while some theoretical studies on the interaction between short-
run and long-run decisions in oligopoly have found that less short-run competition
may result in, or be associated with, more investment in the long-run variable (such as
R&D expenditure), others have shown this result to depend on particular functional
forms or the specification of the collusive technology (see Yarrow 1985, Fershtman
and Gandal 1994, Ziss 1994, Fershtman and Muller 1986, Davidson and Deneckere
1990, Fershtman and Pakes 2000).1 Recent endogenous growth models of innovation
                                                
1 A common assumption in this context is that firms cannot collude in the long-run variable,
whatever their short-run conduct. This is often justified in theoretical studies by a reference to
the fact that long detection and retaliation lags hinder the stability of collusion. As long-term
decisions take time to implement, the reaction to rivals’ behaviour is relatively slow, i.e. there
are relatively long retaliation lags; hence collusion in long-run variables will be relatively
difficult to achieve. In the case of R&D, an additional argument is that deviations from
agreed levels of R&D expenditure are difficult to observe, at least as long as R&D
2have produced mixed results, although they have succeeded in identifying specific
conditions that may determine whether competition is associated with more or less
innovation (see Aghion and Howitt 1997, 1998, Aghion et al. 1999).
On the empirical side, recent surveys (e.g. Cohen 1995, Symeonidis 1996)
suggest that there is no strong general relationship between market power and
innovation, and that industry characteristics such as appropriability conditions,
demand, and especially technological opportunity explain much more of the cross-
industry variation in R&D intensity and innovation than market power or market
structure. It is therefore all the more interesting that the results from a number of UK
studies of innovation seem to be less ambiguous. In particular, both Geroski (1990)
and Blundell et al. (1995) have found evidence of a positive link between competition
and innovation in British industry.
One of the key methodological problems in the empirical literature on the
determinants of innovation has been the relative neglect, until recently, of the
endogeneity of market structure. Thus an implicit assumption in many studies has
been that market power is greater in concentrated markets. This implies that to
analyse the effect of market power on innovation one can simply examine the effect
of concentration or firm numbers on innovation. This approach is not justified in a
framework where market structure is seen as endogenous. For example, there is
evidence that more intense price competition can result in higher concentration
(Sutton 1991, Symeonidis 2000a, 2001). This and other recent work suggests that (i)
market structure cannot be taken as a proxy for market power in cross-industry
studies and (ii) both innovation and market structure must be seen as jointly
                                                                                                                                           
cooperation does not take the form of a joint venture; in other words, detection is also
problematic, and this further hinders collusion on R&D.
3determined endogenous variables, a view which is consistent with much recent work
on technological change and the evolution of market structure in R&D-intensive
industries (see Utterbach and Suarez 1993, Klepper 1996, Klepper and Simons 1997,
Sutton 1996, 1998, among others).
There have been numerous attempts to address one or the other of these issues
in econometric work. Some studies of innovation have used measures of competitive
pressure or market power other than market structure, such as import penetration.
Others have tried to address the endogeneity issue by using instrumental variable
techniques or by estimating simultaneous equation systems. However, none of these
studies has explicitly modelled innovative output and concentration as jointly
determined by some exogenous measure of competition (as well as other variables).
This paper takes this later approach. In addition, it introduces a third
endogenous variable of interest, namely profitability. The paper mainly focuses on
industries where R&D and technological innovations are important for competition.
Equilibrium in such industries is seen as involving the joint determination of market
structure, R&D expenditure, innovative output, and profits.  The exogenous factors in
this framework include short-run conduct, which is referred to as ‘price competition’
irrespective of whether firms set prices or quantities. The intensity of price
competition, as defined here, can be thought of as an inverse measure of the degree of
collusion, but it is not equivalent to the price-cost margin, which is endogenous.
I begin by presenting a theoretical framework. The model is sufficiently
general to allow for a variety of possible outcomes regarding the effect of price
competition on innovation. This approach is motivated by the idea that strong results
on this question can only be obtained by imposing a considerable amount of structure
on theoretical models. Such results are often of limited generality or depend on
4features of the model that are difficult to observe or measure across industries. My
approach is also motivated by the inconclusiveness of much of the existing literature
on the links between market power and innovation. Instead, I focus on weaker
predictions that can be derived from a more general model and relate to the joint
behaviour of innovation, market structure and profitability following an
intensification of price competition in industries with significant R&D expenditures.
The second part of the paper analyses empirical evidence on the evolution of
competition, concentration, innovation counts and profitability in the UK over 1952-
1977. This particular period offers the opportunity to study a unique natural
experiment. The introduction of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act led to the
registration and subsequent abolition of restrictive agreements between firms and the
intensification of price competition across a range of manufacturing industries. These
can be compared to an equally large number of industries which had not been subject
to agreements significantly restricting competition and were therefore not affected by
the legislation.
To carry out this comparison I explicitly model market structure, innovative
output and profitability as endogenous variables in reduced-form equations derived
from the game-theoretic model. I make no attempt to analyse the interaction between
these variables using a simultaneous-equation approach, since the available data are
simply not sufficient for obtaining proper identification of the equations in such a
system. I use the panel structure of the data to control for industry-specific effects as
well as for key determinants of innovation, such as technological opportunity, that are
likely to be correlated with measures of competition but are relatively stable over
time. Moreover, I explicitly focus on long-run effects, although I also compare these
to short-run effects. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I by-pass the need to
5measure or proxy the intensity of price competition, since I use information on a
major exogenous institutional change that significantly affected the competitive
environment facing UK firms in several industries.
The econometric results from the analysis of a panel data set of manufacturing
industries suggest that the intensification of price competition following the 1956
legislation had no significant effect on the number of innovations commercialised by
firms in R&D-intensive industries affected by the Act, while it caused a rise in
concentration in these industries. It also caused profitability to decline in the short
run, i.e. prior to any adjustment in market structure; in the long run profitability was
restored through the rise in concentration.
2. Theoretical framework.
Consider an R&D-intensive industry where each firm produces one or more varieties
of a differentiated product. Competition can be modelled by means of a three-stage
game (Sutton 1991, 1998, Symeonidis 2000b, 2000c). At stage 1 firms decide
whether or not to enter the industry at an exogenously given cost of entry f. At stage
2, each firm i chooses to incur a cost Ri, which represents expenditure on process or
product R&D. The results of R&D are measured by an index of “innovative output”
Ii, which is also realised at stage 2 of the game. A rise in Ii enhances product quality
or reduces the marginal cost of production; either way, it affects the firms’ objective
functions at the final-stage subgame. Finally, at stage 3 firms simultaneously set
prices or quantities.
The equilibrium of the third-stage subgame can be represented by a vector of
payoffs ),,...,,...,,,...,,...,,,,,( 1 Ni1 cccNii IIIthNSπ where S is market size, N is the
number of firms that have entered at stage 1, h is a measure of the degree of
6horizontal product differentiation, ci is a vector of parameters specific to firm i and
independent of N and the Ii’s, and, finally, t is a measure of the intensity of price
competition.2 The interpretation of t is that, for any given N, πi will depend on the
firms’ pricing strategies, which will in turn partly depend on exogenous institutional
factors such as the climate of competition policy or the degree of economic
integration. The assumption of the exogeneity of the intensity of price competition t is
motivated by the empirical context of the present study, which provides a clear
empirical test of the theory by way of a reduced-form analysis of the effects of a
change in the main determinant of t during the period under study, namely the 1956
Restrictive Trade Practices Act.3
In the benchmark case of symmetric firms the equilibrium gross profit of firm
i can be written as ),,,,,,( iii IIthCS −π  where C is any concentration measure whose
                                                
2 In R&D-intensive industries the degree of horizontal product differentiation depends not
only on demand characteristics, such as the extent of diversification of users’ preferences and
the level of transport costs, but also on technological factors – namely the availability of
alternative research paths leading to different varieties of the product or associated with
different sub-markets within the industry, as well as the extent of scope economies in R&D
across the various research paths (see Sutton 1998). For our present purposes, it will be
sufficient to subsume all these influences − which can be regarded as exogenous − within the
concept of horizontal product differentiation. This is not inconsistent with Sutton’s emphasis
on the trade-off between spending on R&D to enhance the quality of existing products and
spending to develop new products, and the implications of this trade-off for market structure
in technologically progressive industries. In the present model, the incentive to provide
variety increases (and the equilibrium level of concentration should normally fall) as h rises.
3 Thus the exogeneity of the intensity of price competition is probably justified in the present
context for two reasons. First, the key determinant of changes in firms' short-run conduct
during the period under study was the exogenous change in cartel policy (see section 3
below). Second, the state of competition prior to the introduction of the 1956 Act is likely to
have been mainly a function of exogenous industry-specific factors (see the discussion in
section 4).
7value increases in 1/N for given Ii’s (and depends only on N when Ii = Ij, ∀i, j, j≠i),
such as the concentration ratio. I will assume that πi is increasing in C, S and h, and
decreasing in t. Moreover, I will make two assumptions about the effect on πi of
changes in own and rival innovative output:
Assumption R1. πi is increasing and strictly concave in Ii.
Assumption R2. πi is non-increasing in Ij, ∀j≠i.
At stage 2 each firm chooses Ri to maximise its net profit πi − Ri − f, given the
choices of the other firms and the number of firms that have entered at stage 1. Now
assume, for simplicity, that the choice of a level of expenditure Ri by firm i entirely
determines the index of innovative output of that firm, given the fundamental (and
exogenous) technological characteristics of the industry. That is, let innovative output
be determined by the function ),,( ii ReII =  where e is a measure of technological
opportunity (hence Ii is increasing in e for any given value of Ri > 0). Note that this
function implies that there are no R&D spillovers. This assumption is made for
simplicity and could be relaxed without changing the key results of the model
provided that spillovers are not very large so that the gross profit πi remains non-
increasing in Rj, ∀j≠i.4 A key implication of the above innovation production function
                                                
4 To see this, note that the R&D of firm j has two opposing effects on the gross profit of firm
i. On the one hand, an increase in the R&D of firm j raises its innovation index and thus
increases its market share and gross profit at the expense of firm i’s market share and gross
profit. This negative R&D externality is always present in the model. On the other hand,
when there are positive R&D externalities (spillovers), there is also another effect: an
increase in the R&D of firm j raises the innovation index of firm i and thus causes the gross
profit of that firm to increase at the expense of firm j’s own gross profit. The results of the
model are not altered as long as this second effect does not dominate the first, i.e. as long as
8is that R and I are essentially interchangeable choice variables. In other words, it
makes no difference whether the equilibrium of the second stage subgame is defined
in terms of a set of conditions for the optimal choice of the Ri’s or in terms of a set of
conditions for the optimal choice of the Ii’s. Finally:
Assumption R3. Ii is increasing and weakly concave in Ri, with dRi/dIi < dπi/dIi at Ri =
0, and there exists a level of Ri such that dπi/dIi = dRi/dIi for any given N and set of
Rj’s.
The weak concavity of the innovation function is in fact a stronger condition than
what is required, but it is consistent with the empirical evidence that suggests the
presence of constant or diminishing returns to scale in the production of innovations
(see, for example, Kamien and Schwartz 1982, Bound et al. 1984, Hausman et al.
1984). The second part of Assumption R3 ensures that there exists a level of Ri > 0
such that dπi/dRi = 1, ∀i; this is a necessary condition for the existence of an interior
solution to the firm’s problem of choosing the optimal innovation index (or the
optimal level of R&D expenditure).
The first-order condition for the optimal choice of Ri by firm i is dπi/dIi =
dRi/dIi. At any symmetric equilibrium, we have Ii = I (and hence Ri = R), ∀i, so the
first-order condition for firm i can be written as:
.at),(),,,,,( IIIIeR
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d
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spillovers are not too large. It is interesting in this respect that Geroski (1994) found no
evidence of significant R&D spillovers in British industry during the period that I analyse in
this paper.
9Equation (1) defines the level of R&D expenditure incurred by each firm, and the
level of innovative output, as a function of the number of firms that have entered at
stage 1. Note that at stage 2 of the game the Ii’s and Ri’s are the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of a non-cooperative game, whatever the value of t at the final stage. This
assumption is consistent with the empirical evidence, which suggests that collusion
with respect to R&D is rare, even in industries where firms collude on price (see
section 3 below).5
At stage 1, the free-entry condition is assumed to hold whatever the value of t
and is given by
,,),,,,,,( ifRRRtehCS RRRiiii ii ∀+== ==− −ππ (2)
where, for simplicity, C is treated as a continuous variable. Note that the gross profit
has been written as a function of the Ri’s and e (rather than the Ii’s) in equation (2).
This way of expressing the profit function will often be convenient in the present
analysis. Concentration C*, the number of firms N*, R&D expenditure R* and
innovative output I* at the symmetric equilibrium are defined by the two necessary
                                                
5 It is, of course, true that firms may find it easier to collude on R&D when R&D cooperation
takes the form of a joint venture. However, as pointed out in section 3 below, there was
hardly any R&D cooperation of that form in British industries that practiced price-fixing in
the 1950s. More generally, allowing for collusion on R&D in the present model would
probably increase the likelihood that a breakdown of collusion (affecting all choice variables)
leads to a rise in R&D and innovations. A rise in R&D in this case might also imply a rise in
the net profit of each firm, for a given number of firms. Proposition 1 below, which is a
prediction on the joint effect of price competition on innovations and market structure, would
have to be modified to take that possibility into account. If, however, a breakdown of
collusion had no effect on R&D in the more general model, Proposition 1 should still
unambiguously hold.
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conditions (1) and (2). Since I am here concerned with comparative statics results, I
will assume the existence of a unique equilibrium with N* ≥ 2 and R* > 0, I* > 0.
Little can be said in general about the comparative statics of I* and C*
individually without imposing more structure on the model. In particular, an
intensification of price competition can lead to more, less or no change in R&D
expenditure and innovative output. This is because a rise in t can increase, decrease,
or leave unchanged the incentive to spend on R&D. More specifically, a firm’s
incentive to spend on R&D depends on the total derivative dπi/dRi, and the effect of a
rise in t on this derivative is ambiguous. Moreover, the effect on market structure can
also be uncertain: since both sides of the free entry condition will be affected by a
change in t, it is not clear in what direction C* should change to restore the free entry
condition. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive a general result regarding the joint
behaviour of I* and C* following a change in t, as the following proposition (adapted
from Symeonidis 2000b) shows.
Proposition 1. If an increase in the intensity of price competition t causes either an
increase or no change in R* (and therefore also in I*), then concentration C* must
rise.
Proof. It will be convenient to write gross profit directly as a function of the Ri’s in
what follows. From assumptions R1 and R3, we know that πi is strictly concave in Ri.
Moreover, from R2 and R3, πi is non-increasing in Rj, ∀j≠i. The gross profit of firm i
at the initial equilibrium can be written as
,),,,,,|( *0
*
00
*
0
*
0
*
0 fRRRtehCSRR ii +==== −ππ
while the gross profit at the new equilibrium is
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Also, the profit of firm i at the initial equilibrium values of t and N* when firm i sets
Ri = *1R  while all other firms set Rj = 
*
0R  is:
).,,,,,|( *00
*
0
*
1 RRtehCSRR ii ===′ −ππ
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that *1C  ≤ 
*
0C  and 
*
1R  ≥ 
*
0R  following a
rise of t from t0 to t1. Since πi is increasing in C, decreasing in t and non-increasing in
Rj, ∀j≠i, we obtain *1π  < π′. Also, since the function ),,,,,|( *00*0 RRtehCSR iii =−π  is
concave in Ri and its slope is equal to 1 at Ri = *0R , its slope is smaller than 1 at all
points between *0R  and 
*
1R . Hence π′ − 
*
0π  < 
*
1R −
*
0R . Combining the two
inequalities, we obtain *1π −
*
0π  < 
*
1R −
*
0R . This is, however, impossible, since net
profit must be zero at equilibrium and therefore we must have *1π −
*
0π  = 
*
1R −
*
0R .
Hence it must be the case that C* falls if R* rises or does not change following a rise
in t. !
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Starting from a zero-profit
symmetric equilibrium, an increase in t unambiguously reduces net profit below zero,
for given C and Ri’s. For the zero-profit condition to be restored at a new symmetric
equilibrium, net profit must rise. Now suppose that the increase in t has also caused
all firms to spend more or exactly the same on R&D. This cannot increase net profit
because (i) an increase in own R&D has a stronger effect on fixed cost than on gross
profit when starting from a long-run equilibrium with dπi/dRi = 1, ∀i (owing to the
concavity of the gross profit function with respect to Ri), so it reduces gross profit, (ii)
if own R&D does not change, there is no effect on profit, and (iii) an increase or no
12
change in rival R&D cannot increase own profit. In these circumstances, then, there is
only one way net profit can increase, namely through a rise in concentration.
Note that Proposition 1 is a prediction on the joint effect of price competition
on firm innovation and market structure. Can anything be said on the joint effect of
price competition on industry innovation and market structure? In particular, is it
possible to rule out the joint outcome ∆(N*I*) ≥ 0 and ∆N* ≥ 0 (∆C* ≤ 0), where ∆I*,
∆N* and ∆C* denote the change in I*, N* and C*, respectively? This joint outcome
can occur in one of two ways: either through ∆I* ≥ 0 and ∆N* ≥ 0; or through ∆I* < 0
and ∆N* ≥ 0, with the rise in N* offsetting the fall in I*, so that N*I* rises. The
former case is ruled out by Proposition 1. The latter case cannot be ruled out on the
basis of the assumptions we have made, but it does seem very improbable. To obtain
∆N* ≥ 0 following a rise in t, R* needs to fall considerably. If it falls only by a small
amount, it will not offset the direct negative effect of the rise in t on gross profit, so
N* will not rise. But since a significant fall in R* is required for even a small rise (or
no change) in N*, it is very difficult to obtain ∆(N*I*) ≥ 0 together with ∆N* ≥ 0
(∆C* ≤ 0) following a rise in t.
Thus two implications can be drawn for the empirical analysis of innovation
and market structure at the industry level. First, if industry innovative activity
increases or does not change following a rise in the intensity of price competition,
then it is very likely that concentration has risen. Second, if we actually observe that
more price competition causes a joint effect other than ∆(N*I*) ≥ 0 and ∆C* ≤ 0, then
Proposition 1 will have been confirmed, since the joint outcome ∆(N*I*) ≥ 0 and ∆C*
≤ 0 is a necessary condition for the joint outcome ∆I* ≥ 0 and ∆C* ≤ 0. The empirical
results on the evolution of industry innovation and market structure in section 4 can
therefore be used both to test Proposition 1 and to examine whether it is possible to
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establish an empirical regularity which implies a slightly stronger constraint on the
space of outcomes than Proposition 1.
I now turn to the competition effect on the price-cost margin, which, given the
symmetry of the model, is the same for each firm and for the industry as a whole. The
results derived below are for the special (but quite plausible) case where price
competition has no significant effect on industry innovative output and a positive
long-run effect on concentration.
Proposition 2. (i) If an increase in the intensity of price competition t has no effect on
industry innovation in the short run, i.e. before any change in C*, then gross profit
must fall in the short run. (ii) If an increase in t has no effect on industry innovation
and causes C* to rise in long-run equilibrium, then the effect on the price-cost
margin in long-run equilibrium is ambiguous.
Proof. Consider first the effect of a rise in t in the short run, i.e. prior to any change in
C*. If N* and N*I* are unchanged, then gross profit must fall due to the rise in t. In
the long run, C* rises, and since N*I* remains unchanged, I*, and hence R* must rise.
From the free-entry condition, it follows that firm gross profit must also rise. At the
same time, sales revenue at the firm level will change. If it rises, this may or may not
offset the rise in gross profit. Thus the price-cost margin can either rise or fall. !
It should be emphasised that, although part (i) of Proposition 2 focuses on
gross profit, a similar result can be expected for the price-cost margin, since sales
revenue should normally rise, for given N and R, following a rise in t. Part (ii) of the
proposition is largely driven by the requirement that firms make zero net profit in
long-run equilibrium irrespective of firm conduct. Note that it is precisely through the
adjustment of market structure following a rise in t that gross profit and the price-cost
14
margin can begin to rise after their short-run fall until firms again cover their fixed
costs in long-run equilibrium.6
The theory should now be confronted with the empirical evidence. The first
question to be asked is what was the effect of the 1956 Act on innovations in British
industry. This is a question on which the present theory is deliberately silent.
Provided that we observe a non-negative effect, the next question will then be
whether concentration did indeed rise, as suggested by the present theory. The final
question relates to the effect of competition on profitability in the short run and in the
long run.
3. Competition in British manufacturing industry.
Explicit restrictive agreements between firms were widespread in British industry in
the mid-1950s: nearly half of manufacturing industry was subject to price-fixing. As a
result of the 1956 legislation, these agreements were abandoned. This section briefly
comments on the evolution of price competition in UK manufacturing and describes
the construction of the competition data. A fuller account can be found in Symeonidis
(1998, 2001).
The 1956 Act required the registration of restrictive agreements, including
verbal or even implied arrangements, on goods. Registered agreements should be
abandoned, unless they were successfully defended by the parties in the newly
created Restrictive Practices Court as producing benefits that outweighed the
presumed detriment (or unless they were considered by the Registrar of Restrictive
                                                
6 Clearly, these results rely heavily on the symmetry assumption. However the mechanism
that drives the results will also operate in the presence of asymmetries, and it is not clear how
it would be offset by other effects. In any case, this can be left as an open question, to be
tested against the empirical evidence.
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Trading Agreements as not significantly affecting competition). Because the attitude
of the Court could not be known until the first cases had been heard, the large
majority of industries registered their agreements rather than dropping or secretly
continuing them. The first agreements came before the Court in 1959 and were struck
down. This induced most industries to voluntarily abandon their agreements rather
than incur the costs of a Court case with little hope of success. Most agreements were
cancelled between 1959 and 1963.
Many agreements provided for minimum or fixed producer prices. In general,
there were no restrictions on media advertising or R&D expenditure. In some
industries there was patent pooling or exchange of technical information between the
parties, but only in one case is there any evidence that these schemes may have
involved the joint determination of R&D (this industry is not in my sample). Also,
there were no significant restrictions on entry in most cartelised industries.
To what extent did the intensity of price competition increase following the
abolition of cartels? Case-study evidence (for example, Swann et al. 1973, 1974)
suggests that most agreements had been effective prior to cancellation, the parties
typically accounted for a large fraction of the market, and there were a number of
factors that limited outside competition in many industries. This evidence also
indicates that prices generally fell and/or trade discounts increased in previously
cartelised industries, although in many cases this occurred several years after the
formal cancellation of the agreement. Hence, while the impact of the 1956 Act on
competition was not equally significant in all previously cartelised industries, most of
these industries did experience, sooner or later, a significant increase in the intensity
of price competition as a result of the legislation. It seems then legitimate to think of
16
this evolution as a change of competition regime induced by an exogenous
institutional change.
The main source of data on competition were the agreements registered under
the 1956 Act. A number of other sources were also used to identify unregistered
agreements or agreements modified before registration, including various Monopolies
Commission reports, the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and
unpublished background material for the Political and Economic Planning (1957)
survey of trade associations.
The approach to modelling the competition effect in the present paper
involved distinguishing between those industries with a change of competition regime
following the 1956 Act and those without a change in regime. All industries in the
sample were classified according to their state of competition in the 1950s on the
basis of three criteria: the reliability of the data source; the types of restrictions; and
the proportion of an industry's total sales covered by products subject to agreements
and, for each product, the fraction of the UK market covered by cartel firms.
In particular, the various types of restrictions were classified as significant,
non-significant or uncertain, according to their likely impact on competition. Next, an
industry was classified as collusive in the 1950s if the products subject to significant
restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total industry sales. It was classified as
competitive if the products subject to significant or uncertain restrictions accounted
for less than 20% of industry sales. And it was classified as ambiguous in all
remaining cases.7 All industries with ambiguous state of competition in the 1950s (as
                                                
7 In fact, most industries classified as competitive were free from any restrictive agreements.
Similarly, most industries classified as collusive had agreements covering all industry
products. Small variations in the cut-off points (in particular using 10% instead of 20%, or
using 40% or 70% instead of 50%) do not significantly affect the results reported in section 4,
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well as a few with ambiguous state of competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s)
were then excluded from the sample, and the dummy variable CHANGE was defined,
which takes the value 1 for industries with a change in competition regime sometime
after 1958 and 0 otherwise.
4. Econometric models and results.
The econometric analysis in this paper is based on a comparison of those industries
affected by the 1956 Act with a control group of industries not affected. I will use
several different samples of industries in separate regressions for the various
endogenous variables. The reason for this approach is that industry definitions across
the different statistical sources are often difficult to match.8
The theoretical analysis of section 2 suggests estimating the following
reduced-form models:
),,,,,( tehfSIsInnovation =
),,,,,( tehfSCionConcentrat =
),,,,,(Pr tehfSPyofitabilit =
where the variables are as defined in section 2. In addition to the variables included in
the above reduced forms, other factors, including macroeconomic fluctuations, may
have affected innovations and concentration during the period examined in a more or
                                                                                                                                           
or indeed the samples used. The use of a continuous competition measure instead of cut-off
points has proved impractical for a variety of reasons (see Symeonidis 2001 for an extensive
discussion).
8 A joint estimation would not increase efficiency, given that the equations include the same
explanatory variables, and is impractical given that it is difficult to match the industry
definitions across statistical sources.
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less uniform way across industries. Time dummies will be included among the
regressors to control for these. One variable not explicitly included in the model but
generally thought to be an important determinant of innovation is the degree of
appropriability of the outcome of R&D (which is related to the degree of spillovers).
This variable and two others explicitly included in the model, namely the degree of
horizontal product differentiation h and technological opportunity e, are very difficult
to measure. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that these variables will be
relatively stable over a period of 10 or 20 years for the large majority of industries,
and so they will be largely captured by the industry effects in the panel data models
estimated below. As far as technological opportunity is concerned, the ranking of
manufacturing sectors in terms of R&D intensity tends to be very similar between
countries and across time periods, which is consistent with the view that
technological opportunity is relatively stable at the sector level. This is certainly less
obvious for three-digit industries and even less so for four-digit industries, but then
again changes in technological opportunity will only tend to increase the ‘noise’ in
the results, as long as they are not correlated with changes in the intensity of
competition or other variables.
The innovations data come from the SPRU survey of significant innovations
commercialised by UK firms during 1945-1983 (see Townsend et al. 1981, Robson et
al. 1988, Geroski 1994, for extensive discussions of these data). The level of industry
aggregation is usually the three-digit, and sometimes the four-digit level (see the
Appendix for further details on these data). Of course, any attempt to count the
number of significant innovations is subject to some arbitrariness and possible biases
in the evaluation procedure. Fortunately, in the case of the SPRU data, these biases
seem to affect more the comparability of innovative activity across industries than the
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comparability over time for any given industry. This is not a serious problem for the
present analysis because I use panel data, so differences across industries in the
measurement of innovative output become part of the industry-specific effects and do
not affect the results of interest. One issue that arises with respect to the use of the
SPRU data is the choice of time periods. Although the data record the number of
innovations for every year, it is necessary to group the innovation counts into
somewhat longer periods so that they can be matched with Census-based figures on
sales revenue that are available only at roughly five-year intervals during the 1950s
and 1960s. Using five-year periods to group the innovation data is therefore an
obvious choice, but this still leaves open the question of exactly which periods to use.
Data on sales revenue are available for 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968, and then from 1970
onwards. Now it seems reasonable to assume that sales revenue in any given year t is
a measure of average market size between year t – 2 and t + 2. It is also reasonable to
assume that R&D expenditure in any given year is influenced by market conditions in
that year. So if sales revenue in year t is a measure of average market size between t –
2 and t + 2, it can also be thought of as a determinant of R&D spending between t – 2
and t + 2. The key question is: what is the time lag between R&D spending and the
commercialisation of innovations?
It is well known that the time lag between the beginning of a research project
and the commercialisation of innovations varies greatly. Estimates of the average lag
across industries range from one to four years (see Mansfield et al. 1971, Pakes and
Schankerman 1984, Acs and Audretsch 1988). There is also evidence, at least for the
UK, that R&D expenditure tends to increase toward the end of a research project
(Schott 1976). One way of linking R&D spending and innovation counts which is
often used in the empirical literature is to hypothesise that the bulk of R&D spending
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for innovations commercialised at year t takes place at a certain year t – x, where x is
an average across industries and types of innovations. What should be the value of x?
If the average lag between the beginning of a project and the commercialisation of
innovations is 1-4 years, the average lag between the bulk of R&D spending and the
commercialisation of innovations would be 1-2 years. On the assumption of a one-
year lag, the number of innovations commercialised in year t is determined, on
average, by market conditions in year t − 1. Thus sales revenue in year t (which, as
already pointed out, is a measure of average market size between year t – 2 and year t
+ 2) should be matched with the number of innovations commercialised between year
t – 1 and year t + 3.
The time periods chosen for grouping the innovations data in this paper are
therefore 1952-1956, 1957-1961, 1962-1966, 1967-1971, and 1972-1976. These were
matched with data on sales revenue (and capital intensity) for 1953 (my estimates),
1958, 1963, 1968, and 1973, respectively. While the assumption of a one-year
innovation lag seems reasonable and has also been used in previous studies using the
SPRU data (e.g. Blundell et al. 1995), I also experimented with an alternative set of
time periods for grouping innovation counts, chosen on the assumption of an average
two-year lag between the bulk of R&D spending and the commercialisation of
innovations. This implied matching innovation periods 1953-1957, 1958-1962, 1963-
1967, 1968-1972 and 1973-1977 with sales revenue data for 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968
and 1973, respectively. Both sets of results will be reported below, although they are,
in fact, very similar.9
                                                
9 Note that the introduction of an innovation in the UK by a domestic firm does not
necessarily imply that this firm has actually produced the innovation; often it may have
simply imported it. The SPRU data report, for each innovation, the country of origin, and,
although there are serious doubts regarding the reliability of this information (see Townsend
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The basic econometric model for innovation counts is
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The dependent variable is the total number of innovations introduced by firms in any
given industry and period, defined in two different ways. In particular, INN1 is
defined assuming a one-year innovation lag; thus the time periods used for grouping
innovations to construct INN1 are 1952-56, 1957-61, 1962-66, 1967-71 and 1972-76.
INN2 is defined on the basis of two-year innovation lag; i.e. the time periods for
grouping the innovations are in this case 1953-57, 1958-62, 1963-67, 1968-72 and
1973-77.
The independent variables are defined as follows. ‘Sales’ is either total sales
revenue by UK firms deflated by the general producer price index (SS) or total sales
revenue deflated by an industry-specific producer price index (DS). K/L is the capital-
labour ratio, defined at the three-digit industry level; this is a proxy for setup cost.10
Y58, Y63, Y68 and Y73 are time dummies corresponding to time periods 1952-56,
1957-61, etc when INN1 is used, or to 1953-57, 1958-62, etc when INN2 is used.
Finally, the interaction terms capture any differences in the evolution of innovation
                                                                                                                                           
et al. 1981), the country-of-origin indicator can be used to check the robustness of the results
to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The results from regressions excluding
innovations reported in the SPRU data as having originated outside the UK were very similar
to the results reported in Table 1 below.
10 An alternative proxy, namely the capital stock divided by the number of plants, K/N, gave
similar results to those in Table 1. Note that, since the model includes industry-specific
effects, one need not assume that the K/L or K/N are adequate measures of setup cost. All that
is required is that the change in K/L or K/N is an adequate measure of the change in setup
cost, an assumption that seems quite plausible.
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counts after 1958 between industries with a change in competition regime (CHANGE
= 1) and industries without such a change (CHANGE = 0). Thus the coefficient on
CHANGE*Y58 measures the effect of the 1956 Act on the introduction of innovations
during the period 1957-61 (or 1985-62); the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 measures
the effect of the 1956 Act on the introduction of innovations during the period 1962-
66 (or 1963-67); and so on. The benchmark period is 1952-56 (or 1953-57). Details
on variable definition and data sources are provided in the Appendix.
The potential endogeneity of CHANGE is an obvious cause for concern. Put
simply, the potential problem is that whatever difference one may observe in the
evolution of industries with CHANGE = 1 and industries with CHANGE = 0 during
the 1960s may be to some extent due to unobserved characteristics that differ between
the two groups of industries rather than to any effect of the legislation. Ideally, one
would want to be able to test formally for exogeneity, but this is impossible here
since there are no appropriate instruments for CHANGE. How serious is the problem?
At first sight, it may seem quite serious in the present case, since the initial conditions
regarding innovative activity are very different in two groups. For instance, the mean
number of innovations introduced between 1952 and 1956 is 1.8 (with a standard
deviation of 2.2) in 10 R&D-intensive industries with a subsequent change in regime
and 5.4 (with a standard deviation of 4.9) in 20 R&D-intensive industries without
such a change. However, the picture is still very much the same 10 and even 20 years
later, when competition had generally been established in previously collusive
industries. For instance, the mean number of innovations introduced between 1972
and 1976 is 2.3 in the 10 industries with CHANGE = 1 and 7.9 in the 20 industries
with CHANGE = 0. This suggests that cartelisation in the 1950s is correlated with
some variable that strongly influences innovative activity but remains relatively
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stable over time in any given industry. An obvious candidate is technological
opportunity. This, as indeed any other time-invariant industry-specific characteristic,
is captured in the present model by the industry-specific effects. Hence that should
not lead to any endogeneity bias, provided that one uses a specification that accounts
for the correlation between regressors and industry effects.
Moreover, there is an additional indirect check: one can examine the way the
two groups of industries evolve between the period 1952-1956 and the period 1957-
1962. Because of the time lag between the launch of an R&D project and the
commercialisation of innovations and the fact that in several R&D-intensive
industries price-fixing agreements were not abandoned until the early 1960s or
sometimes even later, any differences in the evolution of innovative activity between
the two groups of industries during these years cannot be attributed to the effect of the
1956 Act. If there is an endogeneity problem with CHANGE that might affect the
regression results, then there should be evidence that the two groups of industries
evolved in different ways during the 1950s. The simplest way this can be checked is
by looking at the descriptive statistics. The mean number of innovations introduced in
10 R&D-intensive industries with a subsequent change in competition regime is 1.8
during 1952-1956 and 3.1 during 1957-1961. The respective figures for 20 R&D-
intensive industries without a change in regime are 5.4 and 7.6.  Thus there is no
evidence that innovative activity changed in different ways in the two groups of
industries during the 1950s: the increase in innovations between 1952-1956 and
1957-1961 can be attributed to a common time trend. As we will see below, this is
confirmed in the context of the regression results by the fact that the coefficient on
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CHANGE*Y58 is not statistically significant.11 We may therefore conclude that any
estimated difference between the two groups in later periods should be due to the
1956 legislation. Alternatively, if it turns out that there is no difference between the
two groups in later periods, we may conclude that the legislation had no effect on
innovation.
Three key features of the innovations data have directed the choice of
econometric specification. First, it is evident from the raw data that there is very
considerable overdispersion (cf. the means and standard deviations reported above).
The overdispersion is so pronounced that it will certainly persist in any Poisson
regression: the conditional variance of the dependent variable, although somewhat
reduced through the inclusion of regressors, will remain larger than the conditional
mean. In such circumstances, the standard Poisson model is not appropriate, even if
one can partly control for heterogeneity through the use of fixed industry-specific
effects (see Cameron and Trivedi 1998, Hausman et al. 1984). On the other hand, a
random-effects Poisson model does allow for overdispersion, and a negative binomial
model can provide valid results under overdispersion in all circumstances. Second,
there is no ‘excess zeros’ problem in the present data: only in 18 out of 150
observations in the basic sample does the dependent variable INN1 take the value 0.
And third, as already mentioned, cartelised industries had, on average, a much lower
mean number of innovations throughout the period than non-cartelised industries.
This implies that CHANGE is probably correlated with the industry-specific effects,
                                                
11 A valid objection to this second type of check is that, if CHANGE were indeed endogenous,
then the coefficient on CHANGE*Y58 would itself be biased. However, this check is intended
here as a mere confirmation of the picture that emerges from the descriptive statistics, not as a
formal test.
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so a random-effects model cannot be used. To obtain consistent estimates, the
conditional fixed-effects negative binomial specification proposed in Hausman et al.
(1984) will be used below.
A potential limitation of my specification for innovation counts is that,
although it controls for fixed industry effects, it does not allow for any effect of past
innovative activity within an industry or by firms in other industries on current
innovation. A dynamic specification cannot be used here because of data limitations.
However, the effect of past on current innovation – unlike the impact of industry-
specific characteristics, which is captured by the industry effects – may not be as
important in industry-level data as it often is in firm-level data. Moreover, while the
production of innovations in an industry may be generally influenced by knowledge
generated in other industries, Geroski (1994) − who worked with annual firm-level
and industry-level innovations data for much of the period that I analyse in this paper
– found no evidence of significant cross-industry (or indeed within-industry) R&D
spillovers in UK manufacturing.
The first four columns of Table 1 present results for the basic sample of 30
R&D-intensive industries, i.e. industries with average R&D-sales ratio (RDS) during
the period examined here higher than 1%. The main reason for focusing on R&D-
intensive industries was the expectation that any systematic impact of price
competition on the production of innovations might be more difficult to identify or
less relevant in industries where R&D is not a key strategic variable. In any case, the
last four columns of Table 1 contain results for a larger sample of 42 industries. For
this sample, I have added to the basic sample a number of industries with average
RDS < 1% but with relatively high numbers of innovations in the SPRU database.
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There is no evidence of any significant effect of the intensification of price
competition following the 1956 Act on innovations introduced in British industry,
either in the short run or in the long run. The coefficients on all the interaction terms
are statistically insignificant, even at the 20% level, in all regressions. An interesting
feature of the results presented in Table 1 is the almost general failure of the
explanatory variables in these regressions. Time-invariant industry-specific
characteristics seem to account for much of the cross-industry variation in innovation
counts. As already mentioned above, one variable that is almost certainly picked up
by the industry effects is technological opportunity. In addition, a lot of variation in
innovation counts seems to be due to variables difficult to measure or to observe,
including random events. It is nevertheless reassuring that the coefficients on the
market size proxies are often statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level in
regressions using the larger sample. This suggests that, for the market size variables,
the high standard errors may be due to the smallness of the samples used. A similar
argument cannot be made with respect to the competition variable.12
Given these results, theory predicts that concentration must have risen in
R&D-intensive industries affected by the 1956 Act. The impact on concentration
across classes of industries, including R&D-intensive industries, has been analysed
elsewhere (Symeonidis 2000a), so only a summary of the results will be given here.
Concentration data at the four-digit level of aggregation are available for 1958, 1963,
                                                
12 The rate of growth has sometimes been used instead of market size as a regressor in
empirical models of innovation. To see whether this makes any difference to my results, I
estimated a model including ∆lnSS or ∆lnDS among the regressors, defined for industry i and
year t as the change in lnSS or lnDS, respectively, in the five-year period preceding year t.
The coefficients on these variables were everywhere highly non-significant, and the rest of
the results did not change much. Note that, in order to use this alternative specification, the
first-year observation for each industry had to be dropped.
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1968 and 1975. The sample contains industries with an average or typical R&D-sales
ratio (RDS) of more than 1% over the relevant period, excluding industries with
ambiguous state of competition in 1958 (or, in a few cases, ambiguous state of
competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s), as well as industries with a switch of
regime but for which concentration data were not available for at least 1958, 1963
and either 1968 or 1975. This is an unbalanced sample, chiefly as a result of the fact
that concentration data for 1958 are not available for a large number of R&D-
intensive industries.
Descriptive statistics for the five-firm sales concentration ratio C5 in 1958 for
industries with and industries without a change in competition regime after 1958
suggest that there was no significant difference between the two groups: the mean C5
is 0.704 for the 10 cartelised industries in the sample and 0.683 for the 23 non-
cartelised industries with available data for that year. To compare the evolution of the
two groups after 1958, I use the econometric model
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where ‘conc’ is either the four-digit industry five-firm concentration ratio C5 or its
logistic transformation logitC5 = ln[C5/(1–C5)], ‘sales’ is either SS or DS (see
above), K/x is either the three-digit industry capital-labour ratio K/L or the three-digit
industry capital stock of the average plant K/N, Y63, Y68 and Y73 are time dummies
for 1963, 1968 and 1975 respectively, and the interaction terms capture any
differences in the evolution of concentration counts after 1958 between industries
with a change in competition regime (CHANGE = 1) and industries without such a
change (CHANGE = 0). Thus the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 measures the effect of
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the 1956 Act on concentration by 1963; the coefficient on CHANGE*Y68 measures
the effect by 1968; and the coefficient on CHANGE*Y75 measures the effect by 1975.
The benchmark year is 1958.
Table 2 presents results using a random effects specification. There are 10
industries with cancelled agreements in these samples. There is a strong positive
competition effect on concentration in R&D-intensive industries: the coefficients on
CHANGE*Y68 and CHANGE*Y75 are everywhere positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level. Note that this is in contrast with the market size effect,
which breaks down: the coefficients on the sales variables have conflicting signs and
are nowhere significant at the 5% level. Most of the competition effect was realised
between 1963 and 1968, although there seems to have been some effect even after
1968. Moreover, there has been practically no effect between 1958 and 1963.
The timing of these changes in market structure is very interesting since it has
clear implications for the analysis of the evolution of profitability, to which I now
turn. Industry price-cost margins for 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1973 can be
constructed from information available in the individual reports of the Census of
Production. The level of aggregation is sometimes the three-digit level and sometimes
the four-digit level. Because of changes in industry definitions over time, the sample
of industries for the analysis of profitability is unbalanced. The econometric model is
.73*68*63*54*
73686354)/ln(ln
10987
654321
it
ititiit
eYCHANGEYCHANGEYCHANGEYCHANGE
YYYYxKSalesPCM
++++
+++++++=
γγγγ
γγγγγγα
29
The price-cost margin PCM is defined as net output minus wages and salaries
divided by sales revenue.13 Note that this specification is very different from those
typically used in ‘traditional’ studies of profitability, as it does not include a measure
of market structure among the regressors. This is because it is a reduced-form
equation derived from a theoretical model treating both market structure and
profitability as endogenous. The theoretical predictions regarding the effect of price
competition on profitability depend on allowing market structure to change to restore
the long-run equillibrium. It is therefore important for testing these predictions that
one does not control for changes in market structure when specifying the profit
equation.
Note that a simultaneous-equations approach cannot be used here because it is
simply very difficult to find any variable that affects the number of firms and does not
also influence profitability. Nevertheless, the reduced-form equations can still provide
important insights on the interaction between market structure and profitability
through a comparison of short-run and long-run effects of competition, as will be
shown below.14
                                                
13 Using net output as the denominator of PCM gave results similar to those reported here.
14 Let me also point out again that a dynamic panel data model cannot be used in the present
context because of data limitations. As the years in my panel are separated by periods of four
to five years, however, it is not clear that there should be any significant effect of lagged
values of the endogenous variables because of adjustment lags or for other reasons. Also,
note that the econometric specification that I use allows the competition effect to operate with
a lag, and that setup costs are measured somewhat imprecisely anyway, so some of the effect
of changes in setup costs is captured by the time effects. Finally, it could also be argued that,
if lagged profitability was indeed an important explanatory variable in the model, its omission
would show as significant serial correlation in the residuals. But there is no such evidence in
the model estimated below.
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The independent variables are the same as in the concentration regressions.
Y54, Y63, Y68 and Y73 are time dummies for 1954, 1963, 1968 and 1973
respectively, and the interaction terms capture differences in the evolution of PCM
after 1958 between industries with a change of competition regime and industries
without such a change. Thus the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 (CHANGE*Y68,
CHANGE*Y73) measures the effect of the 1956 Act between 1958 and 1963 (1968,
1973). The benchmark year is 1958, as the Act had little effect before then. The
coefficient on CHANGE*Y54 serves as a partial check of this presumption, as well as
a check that the evolution of market structure during 1954-58 was not significantly
different between the two groups of industries. As mentioned above in the context of
the innovation regressions, this is an indirect check against the possibility of
endogeneity bias caused by CHANGE.
 Table 3 reports regression results for profitability from a random effects
specification.15 The coefficients on CHANGE*Y68 and CHANGE*Y73 are nowhere
statistically significant, even at the 10% level. On the other hand, the coefficient on
CHANGE*Y63 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.16 In other
words, the price-cost margin declined, on average, between 1958 and 1963 in R&D-
intensive industries with a change in regime, before recovering during 1963-1968. As
mentioned above, it was between 1963 and 1968 that nearly all of the restructuring of
                                                
15 The Hausman test typically favours the random effects model. In any case, the results of
the fixed effects model were similar.
16 Moreover, the coefficient on CHANGE*Y54 is nowhere statistically significant, even at the
20% level, suggesting that there was no difference in the evolution of market structure and
profitability between the two groups of industries before 1958 (the benchmark year). Note
that the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 has everywhere the same sign as the coefficient on
CHANGE*Y54, which implies that, even if a differential trend between the two groups of
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previously cartelised R&D-intensive industries occurred. The results reported in
Table 3 are therefore fully consistent with those presented in Table 2: no significant
effect on concentration by 1963, at which date several industries must have been in
short-run disequilibrium with reduced margins (including industries where the
adjustment of concentration to its long-run value was being delayed by a slow rate of
depreciation of the capital stock); then a significant positive effect on concentration
between 1963 and 1968, leading to a rise in margins in those industries.17
It could be argued that the profit equation estimated above does not
adequately control for industry-specific factors that may cause departures from long-
run equilibrium. Hence I also ran regressions including the variable ∆lnSS among the
regressors, defined for industry i and year t as the change in lnSS in the five-year
period preceding year t. A disadvantage of this alternative specification was that the
first-year observation for each industry could not be used, and this implied dropping
all 1954 observations. In any case, the coefficient on ∆lnSS was everywhere positive
and sometimes statistically significant, but the rest of the results did not change.
5. Concluding remarks.
This paper has analysed the impact of price competition on innovative output, market
structure and profitability in R&D-intensive industries. I have argued that strong
theoretical predictions on the effect of competition on innovation cannot be made;
however, it is possible to derive predictions on the evolution of market structure and
                                                                                                                                           
industries had existed before 1958 and is imprecisely measured (because the 1954-1958
period is too short, say), this trend was, if anything, reversed during 1958-1963.
17 A similar link between the evolution of market structure and that of profitability has been
observed in all industries affected by the 1956 Act, not only in R&D-intensive industries. See
Symeonidis (2001).
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profitability that are conditional on the behaviour of innovative activity following a
rise in the intensity of competition. The introduction of the 1956 Restrictive Trade
Practices Act has provided a unique opportunity to address these issues in an
empirical context. An econometric analysis based on a comparison between those
industries affected by the legislation and those not affected has produced no evidence
of any significant effect of price competition on innovation at the industry level and
clear evidence of a strong positive effect on concentration in R&D-intensive
industries. Also, profitability has fallen in the short run, but it has been restored in the
longer term through the rise in concentration. The empirical evidence is consistent
with the theory.
The lack of a clear effect of price competition on innovation is consistent with
the overall picture emerging from those few previous empirical studies of the
determinants of R&D or innovation that have used measures of competitive pressure
other than market structure, such as Scherer and Huh (1992), Bertschek (1995),
Geroski (1990), and Broadberry and Crafts (2000). However, the present paper has
adopted a different approach than these previous studies. I have explicitly modelled
market structure, innovative output and profitability as endogenous variables in
reduced-form equations derived from a game-theoretic model. Moreover, I have by-
passed the need to measure or proxy the intensity of price competition, since I have
used information on a major exogenous institutional change that significantly affected
the competitive environment facing UK firms in several industries. Of course, while
the use of reduced-form equations is a powerful way to reveal overall effects, it may
fail to capture some potentially interesting interactions between the variables of
interest. For instance, it could be the case that innovations are often introduced by
new entrants (as argued by Geroski 1994). An increase in the intensity of price
33
competition could then cause innovations to fall by reducing new entry and thus the
pool of potentially important innovators. At the same time, the intensification of price
competition could induce existing firms to innovate more in order to avoid
bankruptcy and exit. Hence a zero overall effect of competition on innovation could
be consistent with a more complex mechanism than the one identified in this paper.
Or it could be the case, as suggested by recent theoretical results on the competition-
innovation relationship based on theoretical models of endogenous growth (Aghion
and Howitt 1997, 1998), that competition reduces innovation under certain
circumstances and increases it under different circumstances. Again, this could be
consistent with the zero overall effect suggested by our analysis.18 These various
possible mechanisms and theoretical predictions from more specific models can only
be tested with data far richer and more detailed than the data used in this paper.
The results on concentration and profitability are consistent with models that
endogenise market structure by means of a free-entry condition and consequently
emphasise the effect of firm conduct on structure rather than on performance, such as
Selten (1984) and Sutton (1991). They suggest that, in long-run equilibrium and in
                                                
18 A third possibility might be that high concentration leads to low (high) innovation,
everything else being equal, so that an increase in the intensity of competition, by causing
concentration to rise, leads to a fall (rise) in innovations. At the same time, the intensification
of price competition could induce firms to innovate more (less) at any given level of
concentration. Again the overall effect could be zero, but the interaction of the various factors
would be more complex than what is implied by the present analysis.
However, this interpretation does not seem to be consistent with the facts. Because
market structure was slow to adjust in R&D-intensive industries affected by the 1956 Act, as
shown in the concentration regressions of this paper, some insight on the interaction of
innovation and market structure can be gained by comparing the short-run effect with the
long-run effect of the 1956 Act. The results of Tables 2 and 3, taken as a whole, provide little
evidence that the short-run effect of the Act on innovation, i.e. the effect before the
adjustment of market structure, was any different than the long-run effect.
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the absence of any institutional barriers to entry, cartels do not result in higher profits,
but rather allow for excessive entry. Legislation prohibiting cartels will therefore
reduce the number of firms rather than their profits.
It is also worth emphasising that this paper did not provide any direct test of
the free-entry zero-profit condition. What has been tested here is not whether net
profit is approximately zero in the long run for the marginal firm; this is a very
difficult task without firm-level data on profits and capital costs. Moreover, as
pointed out by Scherer and Ross (1990), the zero-profit condition is a rough
approximation – especially for R&D-intensive industries, where firms’ capabilities
often change at a rate slower than the rate at which technology and demand
conditions shift. In such industries, and perhaps also in others, it may be questionable
whether a zero-profit equilibrium is actually achieved at any point in time.
What this paper has tested is whether a change in firm conduct has any effect
on profit in the short run and in the long run. The results presented here (and in
Symeonidis 2001) suggest that in R&D-intensive industries, as in almost all other
industries, the level of excess profits in the long run does not depend on firms’ pricing
conduct, because of forces such as entry and exit that push industries towards the
zero-profit equilibrium. It is mainly in this sense, I think, that the free-entry zero-
profit condition is a useful approximation for the study of industries.
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Table 1. Regression results for innovation counts. (Negative binomial conditional
fixed effects estimation.)
Dep. variable:
INN1
Dep. variable:
INN2
Dep. variable:
INN1
Dep. variable:
INN2
lnSS 0.272
(0.155)
- 0.187
(0.162)
- 0.272
(0.138)
- 0.194
(0.142)
-
lnDS - 0.166
(0.136)
- 0.112
(0.143)
- 0.183
(0.118)
- 0.134
(0.122)
lnK/L 0.154
(0.257)
0.073
(0.259)
0.072
(0.260)
0.025
(0.260)
0.188
(0.208)
0.128
(0.208)
0.097
(0.213)
0.060
(0.214)
Y58 0.255
(0.165)
0.272
(0.165)
0.334
(0.173)
0.336
(0.173)
0.190
(0.140)
0.209
(0.140)
0.243
(0.143)
0.251
(0.142)
Y63 0.190
(0.190)
0.249
(0.189)
0.191
(0.202)
0.229
(0.200)
0.223
(0.163)
0.279
(0.178)
0.224
(0.169)
0.261
(0.163)
Y68 0.098
(0.256)
0.204
(0.256)
0.263
(0.249)
0.326
(0.249)
0.117
(0.213)
0.204
(0.203)
0.244
(0.206)
0.298
(0.198)
Y73 -0.108
(0.331)
0.042
(0.331)
0.136
(0.321)
0.231
(0.319)
-0.117
(0.271)
0.005
(0.256)
0.059
(0.262)
0.134
(0.249)
CHANGE*Y58 0.254
(0.360)
0.257
(0.360)
0.282
(0.368)
0.292
(0.368)
0.114
(0.267)
0.119
(0.266)
0.333
(0.269)
0.339
(0.269)
CHANGE*Y63 -0.263
(0.406)
-0.285
(0.403)
-0.107
(0.412)
-0.122
(0.410)
-0.052
(0.273)
-0.073
(0.274)
-0.033
(0.287)
-0.047
(0.287)
CHANGE*Y68 0.075
(0.377)
0.031
(0.376)
-0.067
(0.388)
-0.093
(0.387)
-0.171
(0.279)
-0.189
(0.280)
-0.074
(0.283)
-0.086
(0.284)
CHANGE*Y73 0.180
(0.386)
0.112
(0.387)
0.065
(0.392)
0.022
(0.392)
-0.125
(0.290)
-0.151
(0.293)
-0.155
(0.301)
-0.169
(0.303)
constant -0.799
(1.960)
0.508
(1.775)
-0.157
(2.009)
0.774
(1.781)
-0.615
(1.672)
0.427
(1.442)
0.059
(1.693)
0.779
(1.453)
Log likelihood -233.01 -233.87 -241.91 -242.30 -333.94 -334.75 -340.31 -340.67
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE=1
No. of
observations
30
10
150
30
10
150
30
10
150
30
10
150
42
16
210
42
16
210
42
16
210
42
16
210
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2. Regression results for concentration in R&D-intensive industries. (Random
effects GLS estimation.)
Dep. variable: C5 Dep. variable: logitC5
lnSS -0.019
(0.014)
- -0.014
(0.014)
- 0.07
(0.12)
- 0.13
(0.12)
-
lnDS - -0.014
(0.014)
- -0.010
(0.013)
- 0.12
(0.12)
- 0.18
(0.12)
lnK/N 0.075
(0.015)
0.075
(0.015)
- - 0.61
(0.13)
0.61
(0.13)
- -
lnK/L - - 0.064
(0.017)
0.065
(0.017)
- - 0.54
(0.15)
0.54
(0.16)
Y63 -0.012
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.021)
-0.008
(0.021)
-0.009
(0.021)
-0.11
(0.16)
-0.13
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.16)
-0.12
(0.17)
Y68 -0.008
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.024)
-0.001
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.025)
-0.15
(0.18)
-0.18
(0.18)
-0.12
(0.19)
-0.16
(0.20)
Y75 -0.019
(0.027)
-0.020
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.029)
-0.014
(0.030)
-0.28
(0.19)
-0.32
(0.20)
-0.28
(0.21)
-0.34
(0.22)
CHANGE*Y63 0.005
(0.035)
0.005
(0.034)
0.005
(0.035)
0.006
(0.035)
0.09
(0.24)
0.08
(0.23)
0.13
(0.23)
0.12
(0.23)
CHANGE*Y68 0.088
(0.032)
0.089
(0.032)
0.081
(0.033)
0.082
(0.033)
1.08
(0.71)
1.08
(0.71)
1.07
(0.71)
1.06
(0.70)
CHANGE*Y75 0.110
(0.031)
0.111
(0.031)
0.103
(0.033)
0.104
(0.033)
0.88
(0.32)
0.89
(0.32)
0.87
(0.33)
0.88
(0.32)
constant 0.866
(0.138)
0.814
(0.131)
0.750
(0.145)
0.703
(0.135)
0.21
(1.20)
0.28
(1.20)
-1.01
(1.27)
-1.48
(1.28)
Hausman statistic
Prob-value
4.03
0.85
3.41
0.91
3.58
0.89
2.94
0.94
3.60
0.89
4.47
0.81
1.83
0.99
2.34
0.97
R2 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.21
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE = 1
No. of observations
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
65
10
208
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3. Regression results for profitability in R&D-intensive industries. (Random
effects GLS estimation.)
Dep. variable: PCM
lnSS -0.012
(0.012)
- -0.013
(0.012)
-
lnDS - -0.010
(0.010)
- -0.010
(0.011)
lnK/L 0.021
(0.011)
0.021
(0.011)
- -
lnK/N - - -0.001
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
Y54 0.005
(0.011)
0.005
(0.011)
0.002
(0.011)
0.002
(0.011)
Y63 0.029
(0.009)
0.029
(0.009)
0.034
(0.009)
0.033
(0.009)
Y68 0.028
(0.014)
0.027
(0.014)
0.040
(0.014)
0.039
(0.014)
Y73 0.003
(0.020)
0.002
(0.019)
0.022
(0.018)
0.021
(0.018)
CHANGE*Y54 -0.011
(0.017)
-0.012
(0.018)
-0.012
(0.018)
-0.013
(0.018)
CHANGE*Y63 -0.034
(0.017)
-0.034
(0.017)
-0.038
(0.018)
-0.038
(0.018)
CHANGE*Y68 -0.008
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.014
(0.015)
-0.014
(0.015)
CHANGE*Y73 -0.001
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.023)
-0.007
(0.022)
-0.007
(0.022)
constant 0.349
(0.137)
0.325
(0.120)
0.380
(0.138)
0.352
(0.120)
Hausman statistic
Probability value
4.90
0.90
7.14
0.71
2.28
0.99
2.91
0.98
R2 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.09
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE = 1
No. of observations
40
6
152
40
6
152
40
6
152
40
6
152
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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APPENDIX
Data on the number of innovations come from the SPRU survey of significant
innovations commercialised in UK industry between 1945 and 1983. There are a
number of problems with these data, two of which are worth mentioning here. The
first is that the comparability of innovation counts over time is not very good in some
industries, in particular some low-innovation industries and two R&D-intensive
industries, namely textile machinery and instruments. None of the industries with
obvious time inconsistencies were included in the samples used in this paper.
The second problem relates to the way innovations are assigned to the various
three-digit industries. In addition to a short description of each innovation, the data
report the principal three-digit industry classification for the firm producing the
innovation as well as the industry classification of the innovation. None of these is
entirely satisfactory. The former may be misleading in the case of diversified firms,
which are numerous in this dataset. The latter is misleading in the case of process
innovations, which are a considerable part of the total in the SPRU data - although
probably less than 25%. To minimise these problems, I have reclassified the
innovations in the SPRU database, so that product innovations are classified
according to the industry of the innovation, while process innovations are classified
according to the industry in whose production process the innovation was made. In
several cases I have been able to classify innovations to four-digit, rather than three-
digit industries.
The concentration data were taken from three official publications: (i)
Summary Table 5 of the 1963 Census of Production; (ii) Summary Table 44 of the
1968 Census of Production; and (iii) Statistics of Product Concentration of UK
Manufactures for 1963, 1968 and 1975, Business Monitor PO 1006 (HMSO, 1979).
Data on gross and net output at current net producer prices, wages and salaries
were obtained from the individual industry reports of the UK Census of Production
(various years). In most cases the industry definitions for the profitability regressions
are the "principal products" within any three-digit "minimum list heading" industry,
as defined in the Census. Whenever a "minimum list heading" industry is not further
subdivided in the Census reports, it is used as the industry definition for this paper.
Industry gross profit is defined as net output minus wages and salaries, and
therefore it includes fixed costs, such as advertising expenditure, R&D expenditure
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and capital costs. Sales revenue data at current net producer prices at the four-digit (or
"product group") level of aggregation were obtained from the industry reports of the
Census of Production (various years) and from Business Monitors. Data for 1953 are
not available, but I have constructed estimates for 1953 sales revenue on the
assumption that the 1953-1954 growth rate was equal to the annual growth rate
between 1954 and 1958. A series of general producer price indices was obtained from
the Annual Abstract of Statistics; industry-specific price indices were obtained from
the Annual Abstract of Statistics or computed from Census data on volume of sales
reported together with sales revenue.
Estimates of the capital stock at the three-digit level of aggregation (i.e. for
Census "minimum list headings") were taken from O'Mahoney and Oulton (1990).
Capital stock was defined as plant and machinery. Data on employment and plant
numbers at the three-digit level of aggregation were taken from the relevant Summary
Tables and from individual industry reports of the Census of Production. Some of
these figures were adjusted to ensure comparability over time in the light of changes
in the definition of a number of three-digit industries, the treatment of very small
plants, and the definition of "establishment".
Finally, the procedure for constructing R&D-sales ratios is the same as in
Symeonidis (2000a); see that paper for details and a listing of the sources used.
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